Boeing 737 Electronics Compromised by Physical Device in UC San Diego Research

A team of researchers from the University of California San Diego has demonstrated that a physical device can take over a Boeing 737's electronics, compromising safety and security. In a peer-reviewed study presented at the USENIX Security Symposium in Baltimore, the team showed that a hardware-based attack against a testbed built from genuine Boeing 737 components and aviation software could manipulate flight-path information and alter data used to assess takeoff conditions.

The researchers estimate that installing the device would take less than a minute if an attacker could reach an unlocked maintenance port in the aircraft's Electronics and Equipment bay. This vulnerability pathway involves two computers: the flight management computer, which helps determine the aircraft's route, approach path, and other operational information; and the cockpit display computer, which presents pilots with the selected flight path and additional data relevant to flight operations.

The team built a custom hardware device capable of acting as an unauthorized participant on the buses. By driving more current onto the lines, it could override or suppress legitimate transmissions and insert its own data. The researchers demonstrated that the implanted device could modify information associated with the aircraft's planned route, potentially causing the cockpit system to display an altered path or provide the flight management computer with instructions that redirect the aircraft.

The findings do not suggest that commercial aircraft can be casually hijacked through a passenger's laptop or a remote internet attack. The proposed scenario requires significant preparation, specialized electronics expertise, and direct access to the aircraft. The researchers emphasize that pilots and other safeguards could identify or override such changes, but doing so would depend on recognizing that the aircraft's data had been compromised in the first place.